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legal  realism,  law  &  society,  and  law  &  economics,  and  in  economics  over  the  merits  and 
prospects  of  institutional  and  neo‐institutional  economics  from  an  evolutionary  perspective, 
the introduction argues that a theory of governance must today build on and incorporate the 
developments  in both of  these  regulatory disciplines. Contributions  from evolutionary  theory 
and  sociology,  in  particular  in  the  important  field  of  economic  sociology,  provide  a  fresh 
perspective  on  the  particular  dynamics  of  disciplinary  development.  Authors  to  the  volume 
include Marc Amstutz, Amitai Aviram, Bruce Benson, Gralf‐Peter Calliess, Fabio Carvalho, Paul 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that  nothing was  the  same  in  the  history  of  human  knowledge.2  Darwin’s work  did  not  only 
radically  change  our  perception  of  the  origin  and  development  of  nature.  His  ideas  on  the 
mechanisms  of  evolution  were  soon  transferred  to  the  social  sciences,  though  often  in 
misconceived  forms  such  as  ‘social  Darwinism’3  or  caught  up  in  highly  charged,  polemical 
+ This is the introduction essay to Law, Economics and Evolutionary Theory (Peer Zumbansen & Gralf-Peter 
Calliess eds., Edward Elgar 2010), forthcoming. We are grateful to Mauro Zamboni for helpful research and 
comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
* Peer Zumbansen holds the Canada Research Chair in Economic Governance and Legal Theory, Osgoode Hall Law
School, York University, Toronto and is Regular Visiting Professor at the Collaborative Research Centre 
‘Transformations of the State’ at the University of Bremen. Visiting Professor in Transnational Law and Corporate 
Governance, University College Dublin, School of Law, 2009-2010. Founder and director of the Critical Research 
Laboratory in Law & Society at Osgoode Hall Law School. Email: Pzumbansen@osgoode.yorku.ca. Gralf-Peter 
Calliess holds the Chair in Private Law, International and Comparative Economic Law, University of Bremen and is 
Director at the Collaborative Research Centre ‘Transformations of the State’. Email: calliess@uni-bremen.de. 
1 A. Watson, 'Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal Culture', (1982) 131 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
1121-1157, 1125 
2 See C. Darwin, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in 
the Struggle for Life (1st ed.) 1859); see further the general overview as to both the roots of and the debate Darwin’s 
ideas created in P. J. Bowler, Evolution: The History of an Idea (3rd ed.) (University of California Press, 2003). 
3 See D. P. Johnson, 'The Historical Background of Social Darwinism', (2008) in: Johnson, Contemporary 
Sociological Theory: An Integrated Multi-Level Approach 492-494;H. Haferkamp/N. J. Smelser, 'Introduction', in H. 
Haferkamp and N. J. Smelser (eds), Social Change and Modernity (University of California Press, 1992), 4-6; for a 
particular (post WW I) observation on German scientists’ embrace of Darwinism, see A. G. Keller, 'Law in 





term  developments  and  change  in  human  relations,  societies,  culture,  and  civilization.  In 
jurisprudence, authors  like Henry Sumner Maine6 and Oliver Wendell Holmes7 have  relied on 
evolutionary  ideas  for  explaining  the  structures  of  change  in  the  common  law.  Despite 
differences  in  opinion  regarding  the  analogies  between  biological  and  legal  evolution,  legal 
scholars  writing  after  Holmes  generally  acknowledged  a  degree  of  purpose  in  legal 




new  in  their  true  relation.  The  legislator  is  not,  as he may  imagine himself,  a Columbus. Not 
infrequently, he is merely making explicit what was really implicit in pre‐existing law.”8 Besides 
this distinct disrespect of the Legal Realists for the contention that judges were merely engaged 




Meanwhile,  in economic  theory, Schumpeter’s11 emphasis on economic growth as  the key  to 
economic analysis helped prepare the ground for evolutionary theory, himself harkening back 
Evolution', (1918) 28 Yale Law Journal 769-783, 777; see the response of Keller’s discussion of social and legal 
evolution by W. J. Brown, 'Law and Evolution', (1919) 29 Yale Law Journal 394-400, in particular 397, 398: “I 
think the term ‘legal evolution’ a useful and suggestive way of expressing some of the most fundamental 
characteristics of the long process involved in the history of law.” 
4 See, e.g., G. Frazzetto, 'Who’s Afraid of Darwin?' (2004) 5 European Molecular Biology Organization 662-665; 
see also: The Social and Legal Dimensions of the Evolution Debate in the United States, Pew Forum on Religion 
and Public Life, 4 February 2009, available at: http://pewforum.org/docs/?DocID=396. 
5 K. Dopfer, 'Evolutionary economics: a theoretical framework', in K. Dopfer (ed) The Evolutionary Foundation of 
Economics (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3-55, 12. 
6 HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1861), chapter 2. 
7 OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881), chapters 1 and 2; O. W. Holmes, 'Law in Science and Science in 
Law', (1899) 12 Harvard Law Review 443-463 
8 W. J. Brown, 'Law and Evolution', (1919) 29 Yale Law Journal 394-400, 398, 399 
9 See, for example, J. P. Dawson, The Oracles of the Law (The University of Michigan Law School, 1968). 
10 A. Watson, 'Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal Culture', (1982) 131 University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 1121-1157, 1122, 1124-25: “To  understand the nature of legal change and the relationship between legal 
rules and society, I believe it is necessary to look at a number of legal systems and at the changes in them over a 
long period of time.” The article is of particular interest for Watson’s response to critics from within the ‘law & 
society” movement contesting his claim of a ‘divergence of law & society’. 
11 J. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942), with a new introduction by Thomas McCraw 
(Harper Perennial Modern Thought, 2008) 
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onto  Smith’s  inquiry  into  circumstances  contributing  to  the  particular  dynamics  of  economic 
change  in  his  time.12  Subsequently,  in  particular  Hayek’s  1945  knowledge‐based  account  of 
market  processes13  and  Alchian’s  1950  essay  on  ‘Uncertainty,  Evolution,  and  Economic 
Theory’14  were  among  the  first  to  pave  the  way  for  a  promising  promotion  of  evolutionary 
concepts in economics15, with important parallel developments in the natural sciences.16 As we 
will discuss below, evolutionary thinking has continued to play a particularly important role in 
the  development  of  more  recent  economic  theorizing  about  economic  growth  and  social 
change,  in  particular  in  its  challenging  the  neo‐classical  economists,  again,  with  Schumpeter 
sounding the bells of attack early on.17 It was above all the focus on the dynamics of economic 
change  in  contrast  to  the  neoclassicals’  focus  on  mechanics  and  to  a  model  analysis  of 
economic  equilibria  that  would  eventually  open  doors  to  the  wealth  of  institutional  and 
interdisciplinary economic thinking that characterizes the work by scholars such as Douglass C. 
North,  Sidney G. Winter  and Richard R. Nelson, Oliver  E. Williamson  and  Elinor Ostrom.  This 
economic  analysis  is  importantly  complemented  and  embedded  in  the  historical‐economic 
work by scholars such as Joel Mokyr and Paul David18 and the sociological work by scholars such 
                                                
12 R. R. Nelson, 'Understanding economic growth as the central task of economic analysis', in F. Malerba and S. 
Brusoni (eds), Perspectives on innovation (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 27-41. 
13 F. Hayek, 'The Use of Knowledge in Society', (1945) 35 American Economic Review 519-530; F. A. Hayek, 
'Competition as a Discovery Procedure (orig. German 1968; Marcellus S. Snow transl.)', (2002) 5 Quarterly Journal 
of Austrian Economics 9-23; see also F. A. v. Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order (Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1949). 
14 A. A. Alchian, 'Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory', (1950) 58 Journal of Political Economy 211-221 
15 For an account of the parallel emergence of evolutionary thinking in social and natural sciences, see D. L. Hull, 
Science as a Process. An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science (University of 
Chicago Press, 1988). See also D. L. Hull, 'Die Rezeption von Darwins Evolutionstheorie bei britischen 
Wissenschaftsphilosophen des 19. Jahrhunderts', in E.-M. Engels (ed) Die Rezeption von Evolutionstheorien im 19. 
Jahrhundert (Suhrkamp, 1995), 67-104, and H. Haken, 'Synergetics: from physics to economics', in K. Dopfer (ed) 
The Evolutionary Foundation of Economics (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 70-85.  
16 See previous note. Compare also Prigogine’s observation that “[L]aws of nature no longer express certitudes, but 
‘possibilities’”, cited in K. Dopfer, 'Evolutionary economics: a theoretical framework', in K. Dopfer (ed) The 
Evolutionary Foundation of Economics (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3-55, 11. 
17 J. A. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development (1934). With a New Introduction by John E. Elliott 
(Transaction Publishers, 1983); Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942). 
18 See J. Mokyr, The Gifts of Athena. Historical Origins of the Knowledge Economy (Princeton University Press, 
2002), Ch. 7, and J. Mokyr, 'The Knowledge Society: Theoretical and Historical Underpinnings', (2005) 
faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~jmokyr/Unitednations.PDF ; J. Mokyr, 'Is there a theory of economic history?' in K. 
Dopfer (ed) The Evolutionary Foundation of Economics (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 195-218; Mokyr, in 
this volume. P. A. David, 'Path dependence in economic processes: implications for policy analysis in dynamical 
systems contexts', in K. Dopfer (ed) The Evolutionary Foundations of Economics (Cambridge University Press, 
2008), 151-194; David, in this volume. 
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as  Nico  Stehr  and  Volker  Meja.19    The  2009  award  of  the  Nobel  Prize  in  Economics  to 
Williamson and Ostrom constitutes an  important milestone  in  the evolution of economic and 
institutional thought and invites us to cast a light back onto this theoretical tracjectory over the 
preceding  decades,  opening  up  an  ample  view  of  the  manifold  overlappings  and  reciprocal 
enrichments that have been occurring between economic and  legal theorizing. Such attempts 
at mutual understanding and enrichment are  certain  to encounter numerous  roadblocks  and 
impasses,  not  least  due  to  the  co‐evolutionary  nature  of  the  respective  fields  and  their 
rationalities.20  While  the  breathtaking  ascendance  of  ‘law  and  economics’21  has  irreversibly 
transformed both practice and  theory of  law,  the economist’s depiction of  this alleged cross‐
disciplinary dialogue  is  as  legendary22  as  the potential  interdisciplinary dialogue between  law 
and economics has often been confined. 
 
The  project  pursued  in  the  present  volume  hopes  to  go  beyond  the  ‘law  and  economics’ 
perspective that has been so immensely influential  in legal practice and academia by focusing 
on the dimension of evolution within each of the two disciplines in order to carve out, from that 
perspective,  the  possible  future  possibilities  and  directions  of  cross‐disciplinary  pollination 
between legal and economic thinking. With both disciplines inherently aspiring to conceptualize 
models,  principles  and  systems  of  social  order,  the  discovery  of  a  dynamic  dimension  in  the 




Our  suggested  task  of  identifying  instantiations  of  a  meaningful  reciprocal  engagement 
between legal and economic thought is likely to bring to the fore particular moments of debate 
                                                
19 N. Stehr, Knowledge and economic conduct: the social foundations of the modern economy (University of 
Toronto, 2002); N. Stehr, 'Knowledge Societies', in N. Stehr and V. Meja (eds), Society & Knowledge. 
Contemporary Perspectives in the Sociology of Knowledge and Science (Transaction Publishers, 2005), 299-322; N. 
Stehr/V. Meja (eds), Society & Knowledge. Contemporary Perspectives in the Sociology of Knowledge & Science 
(Transaction Publishers, 2005). 
20 K. Dopfer, 'Evolutionary economics: a theoretical framework', in K. Dopfer (ed) The Evolutionary Foundation of 
Economics (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3-55, 18: “A young discipline, such as evolutionary economics, 
suffers from a language deficit.” Compare with Amstutz, in this volume and with G. Teubner, 'Idiosyncratic 
Production Regimes: Co-evolution of Economic and Legal Institutions in the Varieties of Capitalism', in J. Ziman 
(ed) The Evolution of Cultural Entities: Proceedings of the British Academy (Oxford University Press, 2002), 161-
182. 
21 D. M. Branson, 'A Corporate Paleontologist’s Look at Law and Economics in the Seventh Circuit', (1989) 65 
Chicago-Kent Law Review 745, 745, likened its proliferation in academic corporate law to a ‘prairie fire’. See also, 
B. R. Cheffins, 'The Trajectory of (Corporate) Law Scholarship', (2004) 63 Cambridge Law Journal 456-506. 
22 See only the debate between Coase and Simpson: A. W. B. Simpson, '"Coase v. Pigou" Reexamined', (1996) 25 
Journal of Legal Studies 53-97; A. W. B. Simpson, 'An Addendum: [A Response to Law and Economics and A. W. 
Brian Simpson by R. H. Coase]', (1996) 25 Journal of Legal Studies 99-101, and R. H. Coase, 'Law and Economics 
and A. W. Brian Simpson', (1996) 25 Journal of Legal Studies 103-119. See also the recent revisiting of this dispute 
by H. Hovenkamp, 'The Coase Theorem and Arthur Cecil Pigou', (2009) 51 Arizona Law Review 633-649. 
23 For an excellent assessment, see E. D. Elliott, 'The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence', (1985) 85 Columbia 




co‐existence.  Clearly,  Coase’s  1960  article  on  ‘The  Problem of  Social  Cost’,  said  to  have  ‘had 
more policy influence than any other economic text’24, marks without doubt one such historical 
moment. The research and teaching agenda,  it projected for  lawyers  in the decades to come, 
were immense, despite Coase’s own perhaps tongue‐in‐cheek assertion that his interest in fact 
had  never  been  to  give  rise  to  any  such  thing  as  ‘law  and  economics’.25  Aptly  identified  by 
Coase then and later, was the complexity of adequately bridging the two disciplines in order to 
make meaningful  assertions  across  the  fence. And  yet,  today,  there  can be no doubt  that  in 
spite of such challenges, lawyers have anything but grown tired to apply economic thinking to 
the  development  of  legal  frameworks,  across  a  wide  range  of  legal  fields.  Meanwhile, 
economists  have  been  persistent  in  assessing  the  role  and  increasingly  the  ‘nature’  of  legal 
regulation  in  relation  to  alternative  forms  of  social  ordering,  something  that  has  been  both 
informing and shaping the evolution of theoretical work done on property rights26 on the basis 
of  which  emerged  comprehensive  concepts  of  economic  governance27,  the  economics  of 
institutions28, institutional diversity29, and social norms.30 This work has altogether contributed 
to  the  development  of  fairly  robust  assessments  of  the  ‘environment’  of  economic 
development  drawing  on  a  host  of  different  disciplinary  depictions  of  formal  and  informal 
institutions.31  As  powerfully  illustrated  by  the  recently  again  increased  interest  in  ‘informal 
rules’ or, social norms, there appears to be a shared perception among economists and lawyers 
of  how  customs,  social  practices,  indigenous  norms  challenge  can  fit  into  the  description  of 
legal  enforcement  mechanisms  embedding  an  otherwise  far‐reaching  system  of  social  self‐
                                                
24 Hovenkamp, 2009, at 649. 
25 R. H. Coase, 'Law and Economics and A. W. Brian Simpson', (1996) 25 Journal of Legal Studies 103-119, 104-
105. 
26 H. Demsetz, 'Towards a theory of property rights', (1967) 57 American Economic Review 347-359; D. C. North, 
Structure and Change in Economic History (Norton, 1981), 17-19. 
27 O. E. Williamson, 'The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead', (2000) 38 Journal of 
Economic Literature 595-613; O. E. Williamson, 'The Economics of Governance', (2005) 95 American Economic 
Review 1-18. 
28 T. Eggertsoon, Economic behavior and institutions (Cambridge University Press, 1990); T. Eggertsson, 'A note on 
the economics of institutions', in L. J. Alston, T. Eggertsoon and D. C. North (eds), Empirical Studies in Institutional 
Change (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6-24, 25: “…at the frontier of research there is also a need and scope 
for experimental work with an alternative paradigm.” 
29 E. Ostrom, 'Challenges and growth: the development of the interdisciplinary field of institutional analysis', (2007) 
3 Journal of Institutional Economics 239-264. 
30 J. N. Drobak (ed) Norms and the Law (Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
31 T. Eggertsson, 'A note on the economics of institutions', in L. J. Alston, T. Eggertsoon and D. C. North (eds), 
Empirical Studies in Institutional Change (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6-24, 11: “As the institutional 
framework consists of formal and informal rules and their enforcement, research at this level intrudes into the 
domain of political science, sociology, and anthropology, along with law and history.” 
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regulation, precisely because the ‘legal’ nature of these social norms is in question. Particularly 
in  light  of  the work  done by  sociologists  and  lawyers  regarding  the  changing  nature  of  state 
regulation  in  the  context  of  privatization  of  norm‐creation  and  the  delegation  of  law‐making 
authority  to  private  and  quasi‐public  bodies32,  economic  theorizing  has  become  increasingly 
sensitive  to  the  unpacked  assumptions  relating  to  the  desired  stability  of  property  rights 
enforcement33,  with  the  more  long‐term  consequences  of  this  development  and  the  more 
recent  interest  in  the cognitive basis  for  individual  choice‐making34  still  to be assessed. What 









In  many  ways,  these  developments  can  be  said  to  have  their  origin  in  theoretical  advances 




                                                
32 A good overview is provided by O. Lobel, 'The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance 
in Contemporary Legal Thought', (2004) 89 Minnesota Law Review 342-469. See also the analysis and critique by 
A. Aman Jr., 'Law, Markets and Democracy: A Role for Law in the Neo-Liberal State', (2007) 51 New York Law 
School Review 802. 
33 E. Ostrom, 'Challenges and growth: the development of the interdisciplinary field of institutional analysis', (2007) 
3 Journal of Institutional Economics 239-264; see already E. Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity 
(Princeton University Press, 2005), 21-22, drawing on the legal pluralist critique on rigid rule categorizations along 
the lines of ‘public’ or ‘private’. 
34 T. Eggertsson, 'A note on the economics of institutions', in L. J. Alston, T. Eggertsoon and D. C. North (eds), 
Empirical Studies in Institutional Change (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6-24, 21; see also R. Aguilera/D. 
Rupp/C. A. Williams/J. Ganapathi, 'Putting the S Back in Corporate Social Responsibility: a Multi-Level Theory of 
Social Change in Organizations', (2004) 32 Academy of Management Review 836-863 
[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=567842]. 
35 See eg O. E. Williamson, 'The Institutions and Governance of Economic Development and Reform', (1996) Oliver 
Williamson, The Economics of Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press 322-343; and from the point of view 
of law, see R. A. Posner, 'Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development', (1998) 13 The World Bank 
Research Observer 1-11. 
36 E. A. Posner, Law and Social Norms (Harvard University Press, 2000); G. K. Hadfield/E. Talley, 'On Public 
versus Private Provision of Corporate Law', (2006) 22 J. Law, Econ. & Org. 414-441; see the discussion in G.-P. 
Calliess/P. Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and Running Code: A Theory of Transnational Private Law (Hart 
Publishing, 2010), ch. 2, ch. 5. 
37 N. LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS [GERMAN ORIG.: 1984; JOHN BEDNARZ & DIRK BAECKER TRANSL.] (STANFORD 
UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1996) 
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encompassing  theory  of  society  as  a  self‐referential  system  of  communication,  explicitly 
drawing upon evolutionary approaches.38 Luhmann’s concept of evolution, which constituted a 
crucial element  for his general  theory of society, played a decisive  role  for  law: by explaining 
how  evolution  occurred  through  an  unending  process  of  variation,  selection  and  retention, 
Luhmann was able to provide an intricably persuasive model for the explanation of legal change 
–  a model which was  on  the  one  hand  extremely  sensitive  to  the  ‘embeddedness’  of  law  in 
social  structures  –  much  like  the  Realists  had  indeed  seen  it  –  but  at  the  same  time, 
emphasizing law’s particular mode of change, adaptation and evolution.39 With view to the fate 
of  evolutionary  theory  in  law,  it  is  important  to  note,  that  legal  theorists  close  to  systems 
theory  –  such  as  Gunther  Teubner40  and  Karl‐Heinz  Ladeur41  –  have  always  insisted  on  a 
particular,  critical distance  to  social  theories of  law’s embeddedness on  the one hand and  to 
theories of the ‘unity of law’42 on the other, while certainly engaging with the same conceptual 
challenges – concerning  the  relationship between  law and society –  that  these  theories were 
facing.  Over  time,  these  explorations  have  contributed  to  a  considerably  rich  landscape  of 
conceptual and theoretical assessments of  law’s evolutionary  trends and prospects   – studies 
that eventually received important impulses from both comparative legal scholarship43 as well 
                                                
38 See also N. Luhmann, 'Evolution und Geschichte', (1975) in: ders., Soziologische Aufklärung 2 150-169; N. 
Luhmann, 'Geschichte als Prozeß und die Theorie sozio-kultureller Evolution', in K.-G. Faber and Meyer (eds), 
Historische Prozesse (Deutscher Taschenbuchverlag, 1978), 413-440; N. Luhmann, 'Verfassung als evolutionäre 
Errungenschaft', (1989) 9 Rechtshistorisches Journal 176-220. 
39 For a concise reconstruction of law’s mode of change, see only G. Teubner, 'Autopoiesis in Law and Society: A 
Rejoinder to Blankenburg', (1984) 18 Law & Society Review 291-301; but see also the recent, highly interesting 
development of this theory in G. Teubner, 'Self-subversive Justice: Contingency or Transcendency Formula of 
Law?' (2009) 72 Modern Law Review 1-23. 
40 G. Teubner, 'Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law', (1983) 17 Law & Society Review 239-285 
41 See the April 2009 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL Symposium in celebration of Professor Ladeur’s work “The Law of 
the Network Society” (Eds.,L Viellechner et al., 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol10No04/pdf_table_of_contents_Vol_10_No_04.pdf)  
42 See, for example, the work by M. Baldus, Die Einheit der Rechtsordnung. Bedeutungen einer juristischen Formel 
in Rechtstheorie, Zivil- und Staatsrechtswissenschaft des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts (Duncker & Humblot, 1995), and 
by D. Felix, Einheit der Rechtsordnung. Zur verfassungsrechtlichen Relevanz einer juristischen 
Argumentationsfigur (Mohr Siebeck, 1998); for an earlier, decidedly political rejection of a concept of ‘unity of 
law’, see F. L. Neumann, 'The Change in the Function of Law in Modern Society', (1964) Neumann, The 
Democratic and the Authoritarian State (1957) 22-68, and the excellent study on Carl Schmitt by I. Maus, 
Bürgerliche Rechtstheorie und Faschismus. Zur sozialen Funktion und aktuellen Wirkung der Theorie Carl Schmitts 
(1976) (Wilhelm Fink, 1980). 
43 See G. Frankenberg, 'Critical Comparisons: Re-Thinking Comparative Law', (1985) 26 Harvard International 
Law Journal (Harv. Int'l L.J.) 411-455; R. Buxbaum, 'Die Rechtsvergleichung zwischen nationalem Staat und 
internationaler Wirtschaft', (1996) 60 RabelsZ 201-230; R. Sacco, 'Souvernirs d'un vieux comparatiste', (2002) ZEuP 
727-736; M. Reimann, 'The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century', 
(2002) 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 671-700; H. P. Glenn, 'Doin' the Transsystemic: Legal Systems and Legal Traditions', 
(2005) 50 McGill Law Journal 863-898; A. Riles, 'A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking on the 
Technicalities', (2005) 53 Buffalo Law Review 973. 
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as  from  a  fast  emerging  scholarship  focusing  on  the  conundrical  yet  intriguing  coupling  of 
‘globalization  and  the  law’.44  The  continuing,  indeed  highly  productive  tension  between 




Around  the  same  time,  that  Luhmann  had  published  ‘Social  Systems’,  a  small  revolution 
occurred in economics that elevated evolutionary theory onto a stage for everyone to see and 
consolidated  its  place  in  the  discipline:  In  1982,  the  economists  Richard  Nelson  and  Sydney 






found  to  be  at  odds  with  a  highly  differentiated  landscape  of  economic  innovation  and 
                                                
44 G. Teubner, 'The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism', (1992) 13 Cardozo Law Review 1443-1462; 
G. Teubner, 'The King's Many Bodies: The Self-Deconstruction of Law's Hierarchy', (1997) 31 Law & Society 
Review 763-787; P. Zumbansen, 'Piercing the Legal Veil: Commercial Arbitration and Transnational Law', (2002) 8 
European Law Journal 400-432; G.-P. Calliess, 'Lex Mercatoria: A Reflexive Law Guide To An Autonomous Legal 
System', in: 2 German Law Journal 17 (1 November 2001) available at: 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=109; P. S. Berman, 'From International Law to Law and 
Globalization', (2005) 43 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 485-556; C. Scott, 'A Core Curriculum for the 
Transnational Legal Education of JD and LLB Students: Surveying the Approach of the International, Comparative 
and Transnational Law Program at Osgoode Hall Law School', (2005) 23 Penn State International Law Review 757-
773. 
45 See, for example, the contributions to H. Brunkhorst (ed) Demokratie in der Weltgesellschaft (Nomos, 2009), M. 
Schulte/R. Stichweh (eds), Weltrecht (Duncker & Humblot, 2008) and Peer Zumbansen & Achilles Skordas (eds.), 
The Kantian Project of International Law: Engagements with Jürgen Habermas’ ‘The Divided West’, 10 German 
Law Journal 1-114 (2009), available at: http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=2&vol=10&no=1. 
See already the contributions to P. Niesen/B. Herborth (eds), Anarchie der kommunikativen Freiheit. Jürgen 
Habermas und die Theorie der internationalen Politik (Suhrkamp, 2007). 
46 R. R. Nelson/S. G. Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1982); see already their essays leading up to the book: R. Nelson/S. Winter, 'Toward an 
evolutionary theory of economic capabilities', (1973) 63 American Economic Review 440-449; R. Nelson/S. Winter, 
'Neoclassical vs. Evolutionary Theories of Economic Growth: Critique and Prospectus', (1974) 84 American 
Economic Review 886-905; for a discussion of Nelson’s and Winter’s proximity to Schumpeter and an ultimately 
skeptical assessment of Nelson’s & Winter’s contribution, see V. W. Ruttan, 'Induced Innovation, Evolutionary 
Theory and Path Dependence: Sources of Technical Change', (1997) 107 The Economic Journal 1520-1529, at 
1524: “dead end” 
47 K. Dopfer, 'Evolutionary economics: a theoretical framework', in K. Dopfer (ed) The Evolutionary Foundation of 
Economics (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3-55, 3 
48 R. Nelson, 'Economic Development From the Perspective of Evolutionary Economic Theory', (2006) Working 
Papers in Technology Governance and Economic Dynamics no. 2 available at: http://hum.ttu.ee/wp/paper2.pdf, at 4 
“strongly inspired by Schumpeter” 
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production.49 Building on and expanding  further  a  ‘behavioral’  approach  to  firms50, Nelson & 
Winter posited – against the neo‐classical assumption of firms’ maximization orientation – that 
“a  firm at any time operates  largely according to a set of decision rules that  link a domain of 
environmental stimuli  to a  range of  responses on the part of  firms. While neoclassical  theory 
would attempt to deduce these decision rules from maximization on the part of the firm, the 
behavioral theory simply takes them as given and observable.”51 At the heart of their concept 
of  the  firm  as  operating  within  a  particular  environment  was  the  idea  that  it  would  be 
impossible to describe the dynamics of change of inter‐organizational decisions without taking 
into  account  the manifold  input  and  output  relations  between  the  firm  and  its  –  constantly 
changing52 – environment. This contention still lies at the base of Nelson’s and Winter’s theory 
today:  “At  the broadest  level, and possibly  the deepest,  the difference between evolutionary 
economic  theory  that  is  taking  shape,  and  the  neoclassical  theory  that  has  dominated 




and  organizational  studies55,  industrial  organization56,  the  theory  of  the  firm57,  in  political 
                                                
49 R. Nelson/S. Winter, 'Neoclassical vs. Evolutionary Theories of Economic Growth: Critique and Prospectus', 
(1974) 84 American Economic Review 886-905, 890: “It seems obvious that research on economic growth within the 
neoclassical theory is creating new intellectual problems more rapidly than it is solving them. One can continue to 
search for solutions to these problems guided by the assumptions of neoclassical theory. Or, one can try a new tack.” 
50 See already A. A. Alchian, 'Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory', (1950) 58 Journal of Political 
Economy 211-221, 218: “…the consequence of this is that modes of behavior replace optimum equilibrium 
conditions as guiding rules of action.” 
51 Nelson & Winter (1974), at 891 
52 A. A. Alchian, 'Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory', (1950) 58 Journal of Political Economy 211-221, 
219: “Comparability of resulting situations is destroyed by the changing environment. As a consequence, the 
measure of goodness of actions in anything except a tolerable-intolerable sense is lost, and the possibility of an 
individual’s converging to the optimum activity via a trial-and-error process disappears. Trial and error becomes life 
or death. It cannot serve as a basis of the individual’s method of convergence to a ‘maximum’ or optimum position. 
Success is discovered by the economic system through a blanketing shotgun process, not by the individual through a 
converging search.” 
53 R. Nelson, 'Economic Development From the Perspective of Evolutionary Economic Theory', (2006) Working 
Papers in Technology Governance and Economic Dynamics no. 2 available at: http://hum.ttu.ee/wp/paper2.pdf, at 1. 
See also R. J. Nelson, 'Recent Evolutionary Theorizing about Economic Change', (1995) 33 Journal of Economic 
Literature 48-90. 
54 J. T. Mahoney/J. R. Pandian, 'The Resource-Based View Within the Conversation of Strategic Management', 
(1992) 13 Strategic Management Journal 363-380 
55 M. Zollo/S. Winter, 'Deliberate Learning and the Evolution of Dynamic Capabilities', (2002) 13 Organization 
Science 339-351 
56 G. Dosi/F. Malerba, 'Interpreting industrial dynamics twenty years after Nelson and Winter's Evolutionary Theory 
of Economic Change', (2002) 11 Industrial and Corporate Change 619-622 
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economy58 as well as in – legal theory.59 Meanwhile, the originators of this line of thinking have 
themselves  embarked  on  a  very  fruitful  revisiting  and  further  development  of  some  of  their 










apparatus.65 The  importance of this research  lies  in  its untiring –  if varied – engagement with 
the  tension  between market  and  non‐market  regulation,  a  tension which  powerfully  unfolds 
from  within  the  definition  of  ‘institutions’.  In  Professor  North’s  words,  “Institutions  are  the 
humanly  devised  constraints  that  structure  political,  economic  and  social  interaction.  They 
                                                                                                                                                       
57 See, for example, R. Whittington/M. Mayer/F. Curto, 'Chandlerism in Post-War Europe: Strategic and Structural 
Change in France, Germany and the UK, 1950-1993', (1999) 8 Industrial and Corporate Change 519-551, and the 
contributions to P. Dimaggio (ed) The Twenty-First Century Firm. Changing Economic Organization in 
International Perspective (Princeton University Press, 2001). 
58 P. A. Hall/D. Soskice (eds), Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage 
(Oxford University Press, 2001) 
59 See, e.g., G. Teubner, 'Eigensinnige Produktionsregimes: Zur Ko-evolution von Wirtschaft und Recht in den 
varieties of capitalism', (1999) 5 Soziale Systeme 7-25 Idiosyncratic Production Regimes: Co-evolution of Economic 
and Legal Institutions in the Varieties of Capitalism. In: John Ziman (ed.), The Evolution of Cultural Entities: 
Proceedings of the British Academy, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002, 161-182 
60 See, in this context, R. R. Nelson, 'Understanding economic growth as the central task of economic analysis', in F. 
Malerba and S. Brusoni (eds), Perspectives on innovation (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 27-41, 31, 
highlighting the need to take a more comprehensive look at the institutions shaping technological change, here 
referring to ‘social technologies’. 
61 Nelson, 2007, preceding note, at 34. 
62 R. J. Nelson, 'Recent Evolutionary Theorizing about Economic Change', (1995) 33 Journal of Economic 
Literature 48-90. 
63 D. C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge University Press, 1990); 
D. C. North, 'Institutions', (1991) 5 J. Econ. Persp. 97-112;  D. C. North, 'Economic Performance Through Time', 
(1994) 84 American Economic Review 359-368 (Nobel Prize Lecture); D. C. North, Understanding the Process of 
Economic Change (Princeton University Press, 2005)  
64 O. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (Free Press/MacMillan, 1985); O. E. Williamson, 'The 
Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes', (1981) 19 Journal of Economic Literature 1537-1568. 
65 R. Nelson, 'Economic Development From the Perspective of Evolutionary Economic Theory', (2006) Working 
Papers in Technology Governance and Economic Dynamics no. 2 available at: http://hum.ttu.ee/wp/paper2.pdf, 6: 
“The new evolutionary growth theory that is emerging sees economic growth as the result of the coevolution of 
technologies, firm and industry structures, and supporting and governing institutions.” 
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consist  of  both  informal  constraints  (sanctions,  taboos,  customs,  traditions,  and  codes  of 
conduct),  and  formal  rules  (laws,  property  rights).66  In  his  important  study  of  1990,  he 
observed:  “As  defined  here,  they  [institutions]  therefore  are  the  framework  within  human 
interaction  takes  place.”67  It  is  against  this  relatively  flexible  definition  that  North  has  been 
arguing  for  the  central  role  of  institutions  for  long‐term  economic  performance.  North’s 
contribution  to  an  increasingly  interdisciplinary  dialogue  concerning  market  regulation  in 
historical perspective can hardly be overestimated. As academic interest in the nature, culture 
and  trajectory  of  the  market68  among  legal  scholars,  economists,  economic  historians, 
geographers  and  political  economists  again  soared  in  recent  years69,  Douglass  North’s 
insistence on an interdisciplinary, historically grounded analysis of the different institutions that 
structure market  behavior  proved  to  be  a  crucial  contribution  to  a more  engaged  and more 
challenging  exchange  between  scholars  in  different  disciplines.  Building  on  and  eventually 
substantively  expanding  his  earlier  interest  in  ‘institutions’  per  se,  North  in  his  more  recent 
work  has  adopted  a  decidedly  social‐theory  perspective,  from  which  he  places  a  central 
emphasis on the nature and volatility of societal change and on the resulting uncertainty, that 
characterizes  long‐term  oriented  theorizing.  Central  to  this  reorientation  is  the  role  of 
intentionality  with  regard  to  institutional  change.70  With  this,  North  connects  his  important 
                                                
66 D. C. North, 'Institutions', (1991) 5 J. Econ. Persp. 97-112, at 97 
67 D. C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge University Press, 1990), at 
4 
68 See of course already H. C. White, 'Where Do Markets Come From?' (1981) 87 American Journal of Sociology 
517-547. 
69 See, e.g., J. Lie, 'Sociology of markets', (1997) 23 Annual Review of Sociology 341-360; E. F. Rosenbaum, 'What 
is a market? On the methodology of a con-tested concept', (2000) LVIII Review of Social Economy 455-482; N. 
Fligstein, The Architecture of Markets. An Economic Sociology of Twenty-First-Century Capitalist Societies 
(Princeton University Press, 2001); see also the contributions to V. Nee/R. Swedberg (eds), The Economic Sociology 
of Capitalism (Princeton University Press, 2005), and V. Nee/R. Swedberg, 'Economic Sociology and New 
Institutional Economics', in C. Ménard and M. M. Shirley (eds), Handbook of New Institutional Economics 
(Springer, 2005), 789-818. Besides the recent renaissance in economic sociology, the contributions by scholars 
interested in the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ are of particular interest in this regard: see, e.g., the landmark volume by 
P. A. Hall/D. Soskice (eds), Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage 
(Oxford University Press, 2001), and the preceding work by D. Soskice, 'Divergent Production Regimes: 
Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980's and 1990's', in H. Kitschelt, P. Lange, G. Marks 
and J. D. Stephens (eds), Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
101-134, and J. R. Hollingsworth, 'The Institutional Embeddedness of American Capitalism', in C. Crouch and W. 
Streeck (eds), Political Economy of Modern Capitalism. Mapping Convergence and Diversity (Sage, 1997), 133-
147, as well as W. Streeck, 'Introduction: Explorations into the Origins of Nonliberal Capitalism in Germany and 
Japan', in W. Streeck and K. Yamamura (eds), The Origins of Nonliberal Capitalism (Cornell University Press, 
2001), 1-38 
70 D. C. North, Understanding the Process of Economic Change (Princeton University Press, 2005) 
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institutionalist  framework  to  the  increasingly  influential71  work  in  behavioral  finance72  and 
behavioral  law & economics73 and makes  thus a powerful argument  for  the necessity  to  take 
the complexity of market structures and behaviors seriously – a  lesson which will continue to 
inspire  future  interdisciplinary  research  not  only  in  corporate  finance  and  corporate 
governance74, but also  in economic sociology, geography and regulatory theory.75 Next to the 
field of economic geography that has been gaining new attraction for economists and globally 
oriented  policy  makers  with  regard  to  regional  differences  in  economic  growth  and 
development76, and regulatory theory, which over the past fifteen years has become something 
of  an  umbrella  concept  for  interdisciplinary  governance  studies77,  it  is  in  economic  sociology 
that  we  can  see  a  number  of  important  strides  in  recent  years,  both  with  regard  to  its 
                                                
71 See the hesitant treatment, at the time, by one of the most astute scholars of the ECMH himself: E. Fama, 'Market 
Efficiency, long-term returns, and behavioral finance', (1998) 49 Journal of Financial Economics 283-306, 284: 
“anomalies”. 
72 See the foundational work on the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis [ECMH] by E. Fama, 'Efficient Capital 
Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work', (1970) 31 Journal of Finance 383-417; M. C. Jensen, 'Some 
anomalous evidence regarding market efficiency', (1970) 6 Journal of Financial Economics 95-101; R. J. Gilson/R. 
Kraakman, 'The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency', (1984) 70 Virginia Law Review 549-644 – see also R. J. 
Gilson/R. Kraakman, 'The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias', (2003) 28 
Journal of Corporate Law 715, and L. Stout, 'The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New 
Finance', (2003) 28 Journal of Corporate Law 635. 
73 See the contributions to C. Sunstein (ed) Behavioural Law & Economics (University of Chicago Press, 2000); for 
a very informative discussion and overview, see L. Klöhn, Kapitalmarkt, Spekulation und Behavioral Finance. Eine 
interdisziplinäre und vergleichende Analyse zum Fluch und Segen der Spekulation und ihrer Regulierung durch 
Markt und Recht (Duncker & Humblot, 2006), 80-153. 
74 See the brilliant example: R. Aguilera/D. Rupp/C. A. Williams/J. Ganapathi, 'Putting the S Back in Corporate 
Social Responsibility: a Multi-Level Theory of Social Change in Organizations', (2004) 32 Academy of Management 
Review 836-863 [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=567842]. 
75 As a representative example of work grown out of long-term analysis of the shortcomings of the ECMH, see the 
scholarship by R. Thaler, 'Anomalies - The January Effect', (1987) 1 Journal of Economic Perspectives 197-201; R. 
Thaler, 'The End of Behavioral Finance', (1999) 55 Financial Analysts Journal 12-17; see now R. Thaler/C. 
Sunstein, Nudge. Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness (Yale University Press, 2008). 
76 See, e.g., the World Bank’s 2009 World Development Report ‘RESHAPING ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY’; see the 
contributions to G. L. Clark/M. P. Feldman/M. S. Gertler (eds), Oxford Handbook of Economic Geography (Oxford 
University Press, 2003); see also the famous launch by Paul Krugman in 1992 of ‘new economic geography’ [P. 
Krugman, Geography and Trade (MIT Press, 1992)], and P. Krugman, 'What’s new about the new economic 
geography?' (1998) 14 Oxford Review of Economics & Politics 7-17; see further relatively recent creation of a new 
academic journal in this area: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY (OUP, since 2001), complementing among 
others the long-standing ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY (Clark University, since 1925). 
77 See, e.g., the overview by S. Burris/M. Kempa/C. Shearing, 'Changes in Governance: A Cross-Disciplinary 
Review of Current Scholarship', (2008) 41 Akron Law Review 1-66; see also the meanwhile seminal article in legal 
scholarship by O. Lobel, 'The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary 
Legal Thought', (2004) 89 Minnesota Law Review 342-469; for a refreshing perspective with regard to the EU, see 
C. Möllers, 'European Governance: Meaning and Value of a Concept', (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 313-
336; with regard to global financial regulation, see the poignant contribution by J. Black/D. Rouch, 'The 




engagement with  institutional economics as well as with  law.78  It  is  from here that  important 
impulses  for  a  more  serious,  interdisciplinary  study  of  ‘law  in  context’,  ‘law  &  society’  and 
‘social norms’ in their relation to traditional jurisprudence are likely going to be received still.79  
 
Surely,  not  only  at  a  time  such  as  when  THE  ECONOMIST  would  dedicate  an  issue  to  ‘Modern 
Economic  Theory. Where  it went wrong‐  and  how  the  crisis  is  changing  it’ with  a  number  of 
outspoken  defamations  of  financial  economics’  hubris  concerning  perfect  markets80  have 




an  integrated  analysis  of  economic  developments.  It  is  in  fact  on  the  basis  of  and  in 
engagement  with  the  wealth  and  the  challenging,  analytical  potential  of  the  institutionalist 
framework  that  other  disciplines  such  as  political  economy,  economic  sociology,  economic 
geography and, certainly, law have been developing over the past decades. This context makes 
for  an  intriguing  moment  to  engage  in  an  interdisciplinary  analysis  of  the  evolutionary 
trajectories of  law and economics. The proffered depictions, explanations and assessments as 
they are voiced with regard to the 2007/2008 financial and economic crisis, not only by those 
who  had  always  ‘known’,  ‘warned’  or  were  ‘ignored’,  feed  into  and  complement  what  will 
continue  to  unfold  as  a  crucially  important  theoretical  engagement  with  the  models  and 
toolkits  economists,  lawyers  and  social  theorists  have  been  relying  on  since  the  early  1980s. 
                                                
78 See only V. Nee/R. Swedberg, 'Economic Sociology and New Institutional Economics', in C. Ménard and M. M. 
Shirley (eds), Handbook of New Institutional Economics (Springer, 2005), 789-818, 795: “Slowly […] it has been 
realized by economic sociologists that law constitutes a central part of the modern economy…”. See, in this context, 
R. Swedberg, 'The Case for an Economic Sociology of Law', (2003) 32 Theory and Society 1-37. 
79 See, e.g., the definition of ‘institution’ provided by Nee and Swedberg, op. cit., 797-798: “An institution may be 
conceptualized as a dominant system of interrelated informal and formal elements – customs, shared beliefs, norms, 
and rules – which actors orient their actions to when they pursue their interests. In this view, institutions are 
dominant social structures which provide a conduit for social and collective action by facilitating and structuring the 
interests of actors and enforcing principal agent relationships. It follows from this interest-related definition that 
institutional change involves not simply remaking the formal rules, but requires the realignment of interests, norms, 
and power.” 
80 THE ECONOMIST, July 18th-24th, 2009, 12, 68-72 
81 R. Skidelsky, Keynes. The Return of the Master (Allen Lane, 2009); P. Davidson, The Keynes Revolution. The 
Path to Global Economic Prosperity (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) 
82 For an interim excellent introduction and overview see S. Voigt, Neue Institutionenökonomik (Mohr Siebeck 
(UTB), 2002); meanwhile, see O. E. Williamson, 'The Economics of Governance', (2005) 95 American Economic 
Review 1-18, and E. Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (Princeton University Press, 2005), and the 
contributions to E. Ostrom, 'Challenges and growth: the development of the interdisciplinary field of institutional 
analysis', (2007) 3 Journal of Institutional Economics 239-264. A very instructive paper is still O. E. Williamson, 
'The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead', (2000) 38 Journal of Economic Literature 595-
613. 
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While the need for an interdisciplinary and integrated study of the current crisis thus lies in the 
evident  ambiguity  of  the  very  starting  points  of  any  assessment83,  the  promise  of  an 
interdisciplinary  study  of  institutions  goes  further  still:  precisely  because  of  the  distinct 
premises and normative orientations in legal and economic thinking, there is a great need for 









presents  a  formidable  example  for  the  illustration  of  the  urgent  need  of  collaborative  and 
interdisciplinary analysis of the institutions involved in successful or failing regulation. For law, a 
study of market failure goes to the heart of its own understanding, as the definition of a legal 
concept  of  market  is  intimately  tied  to  the  foundational  understanding  of  law  as  such90, 
                                                
83 For an intriguing perspective on the correlation of different periodizations, see J. Mokyr, 'The Knowledge Society: 
Theoretical and Historical Underpinnings', (2005) faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~jmokyr/Unitednations.PDF . 
84 G.-P. Calliess/M. Renner, 'Between Law and Social Norms: The Evolution of Global Governance', (2009) 22 
Ratio Juris 260-280, 262 
85 P. H. Rubin, 'Why is the Common Law Efficient?' (1977) 6 Journal of Legal Studies 51-63; G. L. Priest, 'The 
Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules', (1977) 6 Journal of Legal Studies 65-82; H. 
Eidenmüller, Effizienz als Rechtsprinzip. Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts 
(Siebeck Mohr, 1995); D. Kennedy, 'Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special 
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power', (1982) 41 Maryland Law Review 563 
86 L. Bernstein, 'Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry', (1992) 
21 Journal of Legal Studies 115-157; G. K. Hadfield, 'Privatizing Commercial Law', (2001) Regulation 40-45; A. 
Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy. Lessons from Medieval Trade (Cambridge University 
Press, 2006) 
87 B. W. Arthur, 'Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events', (1989) 99 The 
Economic Journal 116-131 
88 Arthur (1989), preceding note; B. W. Arthur, Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy 
(University of Michigan Press, 1994); P. A. David, 'Clio and the Economics of QWERTY', (1985) 75 American 
Economic Review 332-337; see also W. J. Baumol, 'Productivity Growth, Convergence, and Welfare: What the 
Long-Run Data Show', (1986) 76 American Economic Review 1072-1085; M. J. Roe, 'Chaos and Evolution in Law 
and Economics', (1996) 109 Harvard Law Review 641-668 
89 R. O. Zerbe Jr./H. McCurdy, 'The End of Market Failure', (2000) 23 Regulation 10-14, at 10 
90 R. L. Hale, 'Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State', (1923) 38 Political Science Quarterly 
470-494; R. Wiethölter, 'Artikel Wirtschaftsrecht', in A. Görlitz (ed) Handlexikon zur Rechtswissenschaft 
(Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1972), 531-539; D. Campbell, 'The Relational Constitution of Contract and the 
Limits of 'Economics': Kenneth Arrow on the Social Background of Markets', in S. Deakin and J. Michie (eds), 
Contracts, Co-operation, and Competition. Studies in Economics, Management and Law (Oxford University Press, 
1997), 307-336; P. Zumbansen, 'The Law of Society: Governance Through Contract', (2007) 14 Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies 191-233 [available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=988610]; see also C. E. Lindblom, 'Market and 
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because  it cannot simply presuppose a market as such.91  In turn,  for economics, and for New 
Institutional Economics  in particular, the question is whether the theoretical framework has a 
convincing analytical and conceptual grip on contemporary complex regulatory constellations. 
As  has  repeatedly  been  highlighted  by  Paul  David,  the  general  observation  that  ‘history 
matters’92  by  itself  is  about  as  explanatory  or  illuminating  as  the  claim  that  market  failures 




alleged  must  follow  if  one  believes  that  history  really  matters  –  namely,  that  government 
should try to pick winners rather than let markets make mistakes. Quite the contrary….[…]. One 
thing  that public policy  could do  is  to  try  to delay  the market  from committing  to  the  future 
inextricably,  before  enough  information  has  been  obtained  about  the  likely  technical  or 
organizational  and  legal  implications,  of  an  early,  precedent‐setting  decision.”94  In  another 
paper,  David  observed  that  “[I]f  there  are  ways  thus  to  represent  the  coevolution  of 
microeconomic  behavior  with  regard  to  technology  choices  (technical  standardization),  or 
conformance with social norms (custom and convention) and correlated patterns of ideology or 
beliefs  carrying normative  force  (subjective conformism),  the explanatory apparatus available 
to  economists  studying  long‐term  trends  in  technology  and  social  institutions  will  surely  be 
much more powerful.”95 As pointed out by Duncan Kennedy,  in  a  comment on Robert Clark, 
‘costs’  are  a  merely  allusive  concept,  that  can  hardly  carry  enough  weight  on  their  own  to 
identify or even  justify  action on  the part of  a public or private actor.96  Tightly  connected  to 
                                                                                                                                                       
Democracy. Obliquely', (1995) 28 Political Science and Politics 684-688, 685: “Market rules do not permit one 
simply to appropriate what one wants. Appropriating another person’s labor we call slavery, and appropriating assets 
we call theft. Nor do market rules provide any social instrument for collective reassignment of claims.” 
91 See only Hale, previous note; see also the instructive discussion and analysis in F. Johns, 'Performing Power: The 
Deal, Corporate Rule, and the Constitution of Global Legal Order', (2007) 34 Journal of Law and Society 116-138. 
92 P. A. David, 'Path dependence, its critics and the quest for ‘historical economics’', in P. Garrouste and S. 
Ioannides (eds), Evolution and Path Dependence in Economic Ideas: Past and Present (Edwad Elgar, 2000),  
93 P. A. David, 'Path dependence in economic processes: implications for policy analysis in dynamical systems 
contexts', in K. Dopfer (ed) The Evolutionary Foundations of Economics (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 151-
194 
94 P. A. David, 'Path dependence, its critics and the quest for ‘historical economics’', in P. Garrouste and S. 
Ioannides (eds), Evolution and Path Dependence in Economic Ideas: Past and Present (Edwad Elgar, 2000), , ms. at 
14 
95 David (2008), note 23, at 175 
96 D. Kennedy, 'Cost-Reduction as Legitimation', (1981) 90 Yale Law Journal 1275-1283, at 1281: “an obstacle 
because it makes the world as it is look rational and necessary, even just (who can object to "cost reduction"?), as 
opposed to arbitrary and contingent. This is a misrepresentation that has an effect: it diverts energy from the job of 
finding the truths we need to know about the world if we are to be effective in trans- forming it; it diverts energy 
from the task of figuring out what the world should be like.” 




emerges  from Professor David’s  observations  is  a  cautionary  approach  towards  a  concept  of 
market  failure  that  is  not  again  re‐embedded  in  a  comprehensive  historical  and  systematic 
institutional study. ‘History matters’, then, is not a sophisticated enough proposal to engage in 
a  layered,  interdisciplinary  analysis  of  how  which  institutions  play  a  crucial  role  in  the 
organization  of  today’s market  economies. While  the  concept  of  path  dependency  has  been 
developed  primarily  with  confined,  nationally  grown  markets  in  mind,  its  relevance  for 
transnational markets and  transnational  regulatory  theory  follows  from the  realization of  the 
stickiness of existing (and newly created) regulatory structures, something which – as before in 









of  ‘institution’.  For  such  an  interdisciplinary  dialogue  to  unfold  in  an  effective  way,  the 
continued  engagement  with  each  other’s  methodological  starting  points  and  premises  is 
crucial.  It  is  thus  necessary  to  open  up  respective  toolkits  and  analytical  frameworks  to 
comparative and interdisciplinary scrutiny. 
 
It  is  then  against  this  background,  that  we  can  begin  to  see  how  reflections,  internal  to 
economist and economic‐historical  theorizing, are  in  fact mirrored, paralleled and sometimes 
even anticipated in other disciplines that have been engaging, one way or the other, with the 
concept or the idea of institutions in the recent past.99 Within law, and in particular outside of 
                                                
97 P. Drahos/J. Braithwaite, 'The Globalisation of Regulation', (2001) 9 Journal of Political Philosophy 103-128, 
110, 111: “a spectacular example of transnational private ordering”. With regard to the authors’ characterization of 
the bottom-up nature of lex mercatoria as an example of transnational norm creation, see also J. Koven Levit, 
'Bottom-Up International Lawmaking: Reflections on the New Haven School of International Law', (2007) 32 Yale 
J. Int'l L. 393-420, and L. Catá Backer, 'The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Corporations: Using Soft Law to 
Operationalize a Transnational System of Corporate Governance', (2009) Law at the End of the Day (Blog) 
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2009/03/oecd-guidelines-for-multinational.html 
98 P. Zumbansen, 'Varieties of Capitalism and the Learning Firm. Corporate Governance and Labor in the Context of 
Contemporary Developments in European and German Company Law [CLPE Research Paper No. 3/2007 and 
University of Cambridge, Centre for Business Research Working Paper 347, available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=993910]', (2007) 8 European Business Organization Law Review [EBOR] 467-496, 488; P. 
Zumbansen, ''New Governance' in European Corporate Governance Regulation as Transnational Legal Pluralism', 
(2008) 15 European Law Journal 246-276 [available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1128145]; G.-P. Calliess/P. 
Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and Running Code: A Theory of Transnational Private Law (Hart Publishing, 2010) 
99 A brilliant historical and conceptual analysis is provided by Joel Mokyr, The Institutional Origins of the Industrial 
Revolution, unpublished Ms., Northwestern University 2007. 
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contract  law  which  has  attracted  a  plethora  of  focused  assessments  from  the  part  of  New 
Institutional Economics100, there has certainly been an intensive and fruitful engagement with 
NIE  in  corporate  law  theory.101 More  recently  still,  NIE  has  been  subject  to  lively  exchanges 
within Public International Law.102 Another example is the recent revival of lawyers’ interest in 
Hayek’s  idea  of  spontaneous  evolution103  Partly  in  answer  to  such  developments,  partly  in 
building on earlier starting points in Marx, Durkheim and Weber, the recently newly burgeoning 
                                                
100 Here, the field is vast and polarized: see, e.g., O. E. Williamson, 'The New Institutional Economics: Taking 
Stock, Looking Ahead', (2000) 38 Journal of Economic Literature 595-613, 599; R. E. Scott, 'The Death of Contract 
Law', (2004) 54 University of Toronto Law Journal 369-390; D. Campbell, 'The Incompleteness of our 
Understanding of the Law and Economics of Relational Contract', (2004) 2004 Wisconsin Law Review 645-678. 
101 See the early contributions, building on Coase (1937, 1960), by A. A. Alchian/H. Demsetz, 'Production, 
Information Costs, and Economic Organization', (1972) 62 American Economic Review 777-795, E. Fama/M. C. 
Jensen, 'Agency Problems and Residual Claims', (1983) 26 Journal of Law and Economics 327-349, and O. E. 
Williamson, 'The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes', (1981) 19 Journal of Economic Literature 
1537-1568; building on these foundations, e.g., M. J. Roe, 'Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics', (1996) 109 
Harvard Law Review 641-668; M. J. Roe, 'Corporate Law's Limits', (2002) 31 J. Legal Studies 233-271; B. R. 
Cheffins, 'Does Law Matter? The Separation of Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom', (2001) XXX J. 
Leg. Stud. 459-484; B. R. Cheffins, 'The Trajectory of (Corporate) Law Scholarship', (2004) 63 Cambridge Law 
Journal 456-506; W. W. Bratton/J. A. McCahery, 'Incomplete Contracts Theories of the Firm and Comparative 
Corporate Governance', (2001) 2 Theoretical Inquiries in Law Article 7; P. A. Gourevitch, 'The Politics of Corporate 
Governance Regulation', (2003) 112 Yale Law Journal 1829-1880; P. Zumbansen, 'Spaces and Places: A Systems 
Theory Approach to Regulatory Competition in European Company Law', (2006) 12 European Law Journal 534-
556. 
102 A. van Aaken, 'Effectuating Public International Law Through Market Mechanisms?' (2009) 165 Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics 33-57; P. Zumbansen, 'The State as Black Box and the Market as 
Regulator', (2009) 165 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 62-70, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1292789; A. T. Guzman, How International Law Works. A Rational Choice Theory 
(Oxford University Press, 2008), and the Symposium on Guzman’s book in 1 INTERNATIONAL THEORY 283-343 
(2009) 
103 See F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty [1960] (Routledge, 2006), 53: “For the first time it was shown that 
an evident order which was not the product of a designing human intelligence need not therefore be ascribed to the 
design of a higher, supernatural intelligence, but that there was a third possibility – the emergence of order as the 
result of adaptive evolution”; for the distinction between ‘economy’ (as “an organization or an arrangement in which 
someone consciously uses means in the service of a uniform hierarchy of ends”) and ‘market’ (“spontaneous 
order”), see F. A. Hayek, 'Competition as a Discovery Procedure (orig. German 1968; Marcellus S. Snow transl.)', 
(2002) 5 Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 9-23, at 14; see already F. Hayek, 'The Use of Knowledge in 
Society', (1945) 35 American Economic Review 519-530, reprinted in HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC 
ORDER 77-91 (1996), at 88: “We make constant use of formulas, symbols, and rules whose meaning we do not 
understand and through the use of which we avail ourselves of the assistance of knowledge which individually we 
do not possess. We have developed these practices and institutions by building upon habits and institutions which 
have proved successful in their own sphere and which have in turn become the foundation of the civilization we 
have built up.” For a defense against an outsider’s critique of the normative implications of spontaneous order, see, 
e.g., R. Sugden, 'Spontaneous Order', (1989) 3 Journal of Economic Perspectives 85-97, 97; ; see also the recent 
discussion, see P. Hardos/D. Rahoc, 'Blundering into wisdom? The missing elements of Hayek’s spontaneous order 
liberalism', (2008) Working Paper http://ssrn.com/abstract=1261873. 
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field of economic sociology104 has been making extremely fruitful contributions to an altogether 
inspiring,  interdisciplinary discussion about the nature of markets and institutions.105 For their 
part,  lawyers  have  been  pressured  to  respond  to  this  challenge  from  a  particular  set  of 
perspectives,  partly  constituted  through  the  uncertainties  connected  to  increasingly 
contractualized  public  services  and  a  fundamental  reconsideration  of  law’s  role  in  market 
regulation106, partly through an intricate mix of privatized107 as well as transnational108 modes 
of norm‐generation. This development within legal doctrine and legal theory – in the midst of 
which we  find  a  vividly  continuing debate  about  ‘social  norms’109  –  is  of  interest  beyond  the 
unsurprisingly  recurring,  traditional  lawyers’  laments  concerning  the  loss  of  regulatory 
capability  and  sovereignty.110  Even  before  the  2007/2008  economic  crisis  began  to  unfold,  it 
had  become  clear  to  regulatory  and  legal  theoreticians  that  the  transformation  of  Western 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Formalism, Functionalism and the Ironic Turn of Reflexive Law', (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 
769-805 
107 R. C. Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Harvard University Press, 1991). 
108 G. Teubner, ''Global Bukowina': Legal Pluralism in the World Society', in G. Teubner (ed) Global Law Without A 
State (Ashgate, 1997), 3-28. 
109 See E. A. Posner, Law and Social Norms (Harvard University Press, 2000); J. N. Drobak (ed) Norms and the Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2006); for a critical perspective see the author of ‘Order without Law’, R. C. 
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proponents, by D. Charny, 'Illusions of a Spontaneous Order: 'Norms' in Contractual Relationships', (1996) 144 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1841-1858, one of the many outstanding papers in the excellent Symposium 
Issue on ‘Law, Economics, and Norms’, published in 144 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 1643-2339 
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Spontaneous Legal Order', in D. Curtin, J. Smits, A. Klip and J. McCahery (eds), European Integration and Law 
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Contract Law, Working Paper Series No. 2008/07 http://ssrn.com/abstract=1270566. 
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for market  ordering.  As  shown  by  Donald  Elliott’s  astute  analysis  of  evolutionary  theories  in 
legal  and  economic  scholarship  twenty‐five  years  ago,  “Economic  theories  of  legal  evolution 
also depend on the assumption that a  legal system already exists.”112 By not, however, being 
able to answer whether the legal system predates – historically or normatively – the economic 
system,  the  economic  story  of  markets  and  their  embeddedness  in  a  legal  enforcement 












It  is  a  certain  irony,  that  not  only  the  politically  self‐conscious  exclamation  that  ‘We  are  all 
Realists Now’, resounding many years ago114, would eventually be succeeded by the realization 
                                                
111 See e.g. D. Levi-Faur, 'The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism', (2004) 598 The Annals of The American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 12-29, and S. Sassen, 'Globalization or denationalization?' (2003) 10 
Review of International Political Economy 1-22; K.-H. Ladeur, Negative Freiheitsrechte und gesellschaftliche 
Selbstorganisation (Mohr Siebeck, 2000). 
112 E. D. Elliott, 'The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence', (1985) 85 Columbia Law Review 38-94, at 71 
113 For an early analysis of this connection, see of course R. L. Hale, 'Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly 
Non-Coercive State', (1923) 38 Political Science Quarterly 470-494; M. R. Cohen, 'Property and Sovereignty', 
(1927) 13 Cornell Law Quarterly 8-30. 
114 J. W. Singer, 'Legal Realism Now', (1988) 76 California Law Review 465-544, at 467 
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that,  in  fact,  ‘We  are  all  Economists  Now’115,  but  that we  seem  to  now  be  experiencing  yet 
another relativization of perspective. A pronouncement of the sort ‘We are all Interdisciplinary 
Governance  scholars  now’,  would,  however,  have  only  a  faint  ring  to  it.  The  underlying 
conundrum is that of the trajectories of institutional and normative change, which occupy much 
of economic and legal inquiry, before and in light of the global financial and economic crisis of 




challenge  to  the  traditional  concepts  of  law  and  legal  regulation116,  also  the  economists’ 
ascription to law, the state and to the correlation between the two as constituting the relevant 
enforcement  framework  for  economic  action  needs  to  be  revisited.  It  is  here where we  can 
identify an urgent need but already promising contours of an interdisciplinary inquiry into the 
nature  of  ‘institutions’  of  economic  and  legal  governance. Much  seems  to  be  at  stake:  as  a 
utopia of transnational governance continues to linger at the horizon of libertarian imaginations 
of  globally  integrated  markets,  neither  discipline  appears  yet  to  have  an  appropriate 
governance  theory  at  hand.  The  space  of  human  interaction  and  of  regulation  beyond  the 
nation state can be depicted either as the Wild West of unrestrained individual liberty, or as an 
extremely fragile and contested space of struggles over recognition, politics and community.117 
In  the  face  of  this,  has  ‘law  lost  its  lieu?”118  Is  the  ‘Global  Bukowina’,  which  inspired  legal 
sociologists at the respective beginnings and ends of the twentieth century, a realm of law, of 
social norms or of economic liberties?119 What are we to make of these distinctions, after all? 
To be  sure,  this  process does not  continue  in  a quiet  state of  contentment  and wonder,  but 
rather  in  surprise,  happenstance  and  terror.120  We  understand  concurring  work  on  ‘global 
governance’ to provide an important contribution to a more adequate analysis of the pressing 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perspective,  that  we  might  see  emerging  ‘lessons’  from  a  parallel  observation  of  legal  and 
economic  governance.  Drawing  on  the  distinction  between  markets  and  hierarchies,  as 
developed and expressed in work following Coase122 and Williamson123 on the one hand and on 
the analysis of markets as spaces of discovery, learning and adaptation124, on the other, we an 
increasingly  narrow  applicatory  space  for  a  traditional  understanding  of  legal  regulation,  as 
informed  by  a  set  of  constitutional,  normative  ideals  and  embedded  in  a  stable  institutional 
framework.  In  this  situation,  however, we  are  faced with  the  ‘stripping  down’  of  law  from a 
functionalist  perspective.  This  function,  in  a  context  of  a  dramatically  changing  institutional 
environment125,  re‐emerges  as  a  stubborn  insistence  on  the  distinction  between  legal  and 
illegal.  In  concert with  ‘economic  governance’,  legal  governance  finds  its  place  and  calling  in 
contra‐factually upholding a normative aspiration to continue to make the distinction between 
legal and illegal – despite the absence of its traditional institutional framework. Law, then, can 
only purport  to  illustrate  the  challenges of having  to  identify,  create and  constantly  re‐adapt 
the context in which it is possible to make this distinction. This is what is meant with the need 
for  contemporary  governance  theories  to  look  beyond  traditional  concepts  of  political  order 
and democratic governance.126 
 
As  already  illustrated  by  evolutionary  theory’s  noted  ‘language  deficit’127,  the  same  struggle 
over  semantics  marks  the  interdisciplinary  confusion  over  the  terms,  basis  and  contours  of 
‘governance’. While  it  is  true,  that  “[t]oday’s  problems  are  determined  by  the  fact  that  the 
fundamental  structural  change  of  functional  differentiation  has  destroyed  the  Old  European 
semantics  without  residue,  and  that  even  the  most  hectic  post‐modern  polysémies  can  be 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understood only as a restless search for socially adequate self‐descriptions,” catastrophes and 
the change in social structures lead to a ruining of semantics.128 Communication, then, from the 
perspective of  systems theory, constituting  the semantics of  the particular observing systems 
such  as  law,  politics,  economics  and  others,  is,  in  the  context  of  fiercely  competing  ‘truth’ 
claims  brought  forward  from  different  social  rationalities,  inevitably  thrown  back  onto  itself. 
The legal system must – and will – process the change in its environment by relying on its very 
own available operations129  that now will  follow  into  the depths of  societal differentiation  to 
focus on what Mariana Valverde refers to as the small  ‘T’s  in comparison to the  large  ‘T’  in a 
search for truthfulness.130 The same idea applies to other social systems as well, as the recent 
theorizing  over  ‘institutional  diversity’  amply  illustrates.131  Taken  together,  we  are  left  with 
contradicting  impressions  of  a world  falling  apart,  of  reference  systems  eroding,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  of  interdisciplinary  enrichment,  inspiration  and  emerging  understandings  on  the 
other. 
 
This volume accepts  this apparent  contradiction by bringing  together  research  from different 
fields and with different perspectives on  the problem of  institutional evolution. The basis  for 
this  volume  was  an  interdisciplinary  research  project  on  Law,  the  State  and  Evolutionary 
Theory, jointly conducted by the Collaborative Research Center Transformations of the State at 
the  University  of  Bremen  (Germany)132  and  the German  Law  Journal.133  In  addition  to  work 
developed  in this context,  the present volume contains a number of chapters by some of the 
most  prominent  evolutionary  theory  scholars  working  today.  The  collection  thus  aims  at 
providing  a  reference  point  for  scholars  from  different  traditions  and  different  fields  for  an 
inquiry into the meaning and promises of evolutionary theory for future theorizing about legal 
and  economic  governance.  The  authors  contributing  to  this  volume  specifically  employ 
evolutionary  theory  in  order  to  explore  the  challenges  arising  from  the  fundamental 
transformation  of  statehood  that  has  been  so  powerfully  captured  by  Saskia  Sassen  as  an 
erosion of state sovereignty both from ‘below’, brought about by processes of privatization and 
emerging  forms  of  public‐private  governance,  and  from  ‘above,’  through  processes  of 
transnationalization of collaborative, regulatory governance.134 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change.  In  that  sense,  the  following  chapters  should be understood as providing a necessary 
first step for putting forward for discussion a number of methodological elements towards an 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